Lei Ding Kun. 7 October 2020
雷定坤：中印加勒万河冲突背后印度国内政治动向简析
Since April this year, there have been conflicts between China and India, and the border situation has been tense.
There may be some chance in the process of fighting and casualties in border conflicts, but judging from India’s frequent disturbances at the border and Modi’s administration’s ruling strategy in the second half of his first term, the occurrence of conflicts seems inevitable.
After the conflict broke out, experts and scholars at home and abroad interpreted the incident from their respective positions and different angles, including the behavior logic and motivation of the Indian government, the long-term impact on Sino-Indian relations, and examining the conflict from a strategic perspective.
The author thinks that these interpretations are very deep and comprehensive, so I won’t repeat them here. This paper takes the Garewan River incident as an entry point, and tries to briefly analyze the general trend of India’s domestic politics and provide some auxiliary thinking for us to understand India’s foreign exchange behavior by combining Modi government and Bharatiya Janata Party’s full politicization of territorial security issues and the change of strategies to serve political purposes since 2016.
1. From “Developmental Doctrine” Discourse to “National Security” Priority
Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has tried many economic and social reforms since it took power in India in 2014, holding high the banner of “developmentalism” to attract votes, and Indian voters, especially middle-class voters, are hoping that the Gujarat model will be successful nationwide.
Since taking office in 2014, Modi government has indeed made a series of economic reform attempts, including greater economic liberalization, improving India’s business environment by amending and abolishing some outdated legal provisions, increasing efforts to introduce foreign capital, and proposing “Made in India” to stimulate the development of manufacturing industry.
Although these “development-oriented” policies are indeed beneficial to the upgrading and development of Indian industries and further integration into the international market, some other social policies of Modi government’s “mobilization-oriented” have largely offset the above reform achievements.
For example, on November 8, 2016, Modi issued a “whirlwind” order to cancel the banknotes of 500 and 1000 rupees at that time. Regardless of whether the reasons for blocking corruption and combating money laundering are valid, the way and speed of issuing decrees directly led to the decline of India’s economic growth rate by about 2 percentage points in 2017. [2]
Another example is the formal implementation of Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India on July 1, 2017, which unifies the complicated indirect tax collection methods in India. However, the tax effect of GST is far lower than expected due to the implementation speed and improper way of the tax reform scheme in the whole country.
Ironically, GST, which should be used as a simplified tax, was rated as one of the most complex tax systems with the highest tax rate in the world in the “India Development Update” issued by the World Bank in 2018, [3] which was dubbed as “Gabbar Singh Tax” by Rahul Gandhi, the leader of Congress Party. [4]
Faced with many practical problems, such as the obstruction of reform and the difficulty in showing the policy effect in a short time, the core goal of Modi and the Indian Party government is still to win the election and continue to govern. Therefore, Modi began to gradually change his campaign strategy and mobilization policy in the middle and late period of his first term. To be precise, the whole campaign logic of the Indian Party has changed.
If the words “Gujarat model”, “developmentalism” and “economic reform” are bound with Modi in the election year of 2014, the words “anti-terrorism action”, “surgical strike”, “national security” and “Chowkidar” are bound with Modi in the election year of 2019.
The successful transformation of the election logic of Bharatiya Janata Party is due to Modi government making full use of a series of direct or indirect conflicts on India-Pakistan border since 2016.
In January 2016, Pathankot Air Force Base in Punjab, India was attacked by six militants, and the two sides exchanged fire for more than 17 hours, eventually killing seven Indian soldiers and injuring many others.
On September 18, 2016, the Indian Army Command in Uli area of Indian-controlled Kashmir was attacked by a group of militants in the early morning, and 19 Indian soldiers were killed and more than 30 soldiers were injured. Ten days later, Modi’s government suddenly announced that the Indian army had successfully carried out a precise “surgical attack” on terrorist camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, but at the same time, the Indian Foreign Ministry said that “there is no more follow-up attack plan”, [5] and it is unwilling to further escalate the situation.
The event was later made into a film called Uri: Surgical Strike, which was very popular at the beginning of the Indian election year in 2019, and generated about $53 million in box office worldwide, ranking first in Bollywood box office in 2019.
In another example, on February 14, 2019, a motorcade carrying personnel from the Central Reserve Police Force of India was suicide attacked by a car in Pulwama County, India’s control district, and 46 personnel from India died on the spot. Similar to the Uli incident, two weeks later, Modi government suddenly announced that the Indian Air Force had successfully crossed the India-Pakistan ceasefire line and carried out an air raid on the terrorist training camp in Balakot, Pakistan. After that, the Indian and Pakistani air forces conducted frequent cross-border operations, and the situation became increasingly tense. It was not until the captured Indian hero pilot Abhinandan Varthaman returned to India that the situation subsided.
Although Modi’s government has always emphasized that the attack or air strike against Pakistan is an anti-terrorism act, every high-profile response of Modi’s government obviously serves the domestic election politics.
The true effect of surgical strikes and the effect of air strikes may not matter at all. Modi’s purpose is very clear, that is, to distinguish himself from the “soft” image of the Congress Party earlier and to create the image of “strong man” who can defend his country and defend his country. To achieve this goal, Modi government accuses domestic opposition parties of politicizing national security and border issues on the one hand, and makes full use of the advantages of its ruling party to use national security issues for election mobilization on the other hand.
Modi’s “Preemptive Strike” against Pakistan seems to contain two meanings: the external strike and the internal strike, the external strike effect is postural, and the internal strike may be the real purpose.
Since the BJP Party came to power in 2014, Modi’s government has frequently accused individuals and organizations of “anti-India”. Even before the captured Air Force pilot Vataman was returned back, Modi has made a “preemptive” speech attack on the domestic opposition parties: “Some political parties have hated Modi and now they hate India. When the whole country is supporting our army, some political parties are skeptical about them. It is also the words of these politicians who are helping Pakistan and hurting India. ” [6]
Similarly, if the BJP Party’s election platforms in 2019 and 2014 are compared, it is not difficult to find that the election platform in 2014 places economic development and national governance at the top of the list, while its party manifesto in 2019 begins with “Nation First”, emphasizing India’s national security as the most important policy issue, accompanied by the campaign slogan “Firm India, Powerful India”. [7]
In 2019, Modi successfully won the People’s House election with the image of “Chowkidar” instead of the earlier “Vikar Purush”. Behind this image change, it not only reflected the change of the election logic of the Indian Party, but also showed that the image of “political strongman” guarding India seemed to be the only “election weapon” Modi could rely on at present.
At the same time, however, the contradiction lies in the fact that being tough blindly may win the support of voters encouraged by national sentiment, but it is often not helpful to practical problems such as domestic people’s livelihood, economic and social development, and the excited national sentiment is often wrapped in social injustice and labeled as “anti-India”.
2. The response and strategy choice of domestic political parties in India
In the face of Modi’s systematic action of politicizing security issues and portraying himself as a “national guardian”, the response of the opposition parties in India seems to be disorganized, especially after the outbreak of the new round of conflict between China and India, the opposition parties’ attitude and response have become more passive.
On June 19, Prime Minister Modi convened major political parties to discuss the border situation and listened to the speeches of representatives of various parties. Generally speaking, unlike the Uli incident in 2016 and the Balak attack before the general election in 2019, most of the participating political parties supported the Indian federal government.
Mamata Banerjee Chief Minister of West Bengal State, speaking on behalf of the All India Grassroots Congress Party (TMC), abnormally did not question or criticize Modi’s remarks and practices, but believed that the decision-making power of foreign affairs was controlled by the federal government, and said: “(Indian people) have a unified voice, consistent thoughts and United work, and we firmly stand with the (federal) government.”
Similarly, UddhavThackeray, leader of Shiv Sena Army, said that “our government has the ability to express our strong anger (Aankhien Nikalkar Haath Me de dena)”. The main parties in the south, including TRS led by Chandra Sekar Rao (KCR), YSRCP led by Jaganmohan Reddy, and DMK led by M.K. Stalin, generally expressed their support for the decision of the federal central government [8]
Generally speaking, except that the Congress Party still openly expressed its doubts about the Indian Party government and the Indian Civilian Party, which is in charge of Delhi, conveyed its anger that it was not invited to participate in the conference, almost all the remaining Indian political parties without exception showed an attitude of not being too entangled in the Sino-Indian border incident, especially the opposition parties in various local provinces and States, and hoped that the heat of this issue would pass quickly. After all, they learned a full lesson from the earlier conflict on the India-Pakistan border.
Since Modi’s government actively used issues such as national territory and security for election mobilization, the domestic opposition party’s struggle in this field has generally failed.
After the Uli incident in 2016, in response to the “successful surgical strike” declared by Modi’s government, besides Pakistan’s denial, the opposition parties in India also openly raised various questions and demanded that Modi’s government provide detailed evidence. However, it was not until September 2018 that Modi’s government released a short official video to respond, [9] but the questioning behavior of the opposition party aroused a large number of people’s resentment, and they believed that this distrust would eventually harm India’s national interests.
After the Pulwama attack in 2019, the opposition Coalition composed of 21 political parties read a joint statement by Rahul Gandhi after more than three hours of discussion on February 27, 2019. While praising the courage and commitment of Indian soldiers, the statement expressed deep pain and anger at the ruling Indian Party’s blatant politicization of soldiers’ sacrifice and sacrifice, and questioned why Modi’s government did not frankly acknowledge the government’s responsibility in the Pulwama attack, but over-publicized the success of the so-called air strikes against Pakistan. This calculation will only further hurt the hearts of Indian voters. [10] Mamata Banerjee, explicitly and openly questioned the authenticity of the Balakot air raid initiated by India and asked the government to disclose more specific operational details.
Obviously, both the public statement of the opposition Coalition and Ban Naji’s public questioning of the credibility of the federal government and the Indian Air Force were aimed at creating momentum for the general election that year. However, judging from the result that the Indian Party used the India-Pakistan border conflict to fully incite domestic national sentiment and won an overwhelming election victory, the opposition party obviously lost the battlefield of “national territory and security issues”.
In contrast, in recent years, the opposition party, led by Congress Party, seems to have made efforts to break the so-called “Modi worship” by attacking Modi personally, supplemented by various issues and policies.
For example, when the issue of national security was fully politicized by Modi’s government and used in the 2019 election, Rahul Gandhi turned to eagerly publicly criticize Modi’s corrupt behavior in the French rafale fighter procurement case, satirizing his role as a “guardian”, saying that Modi was actually “a thief”.
However, no matter from the results of the 2019 general election or the public opinion after the Sino-Indian conflict over the Galawan River, the effect of the Congress Party attacking Modi personally is bleak.
The results of a national questionnaire survey conducted by India-Asia News Agency after the outbreak of the conflict in Gallwan River on June 15th show that 73.6% of the respondents trust Modi government more on national security issues, while Rahul Gandhi, which frequently challenged Modi government in this Sino-Indian border dispute, is not highly trusted, and 61.3% do not believe Rahul Gandhi’s views or statements on national security issues at all. [11]
The opposition party’s efforts to defeat Modi’s degree of trust failed, instead, it constantly strengthened Modi’s “human setup”.
3. Modi’s “People Set”: Pragmatic or Tough?
At this point, the change of Modi and his party’s campaign logic has become clear, that is, due to the unsatisfactory early economic reform policies (money-wasting order, GST bill) and the sluggish external environment of the world economy, Modi’s government turned to national security issues to promote national sentiment, ensuring the successful shaping and consolidation of Modi’s guardian image, and thus stabilizing the votes. Of course, religious topics, as an effective means of mobilization, always run through every logical link.
However, once the national sentiment is mobilized, the voters’ expectation of the Indian government will only hope that it will be tougher to deal with external threats, and Modi can only become tougher at least in his attitude, because once his guardian “people’s establishment” collapses, the damage to the Indian Party is unimaginable.
Another problem caused by this Sino-Indian border conflict is how much is the cost of Modi’s increasingly tough national guardian “setting up people”? In other words, is the flexibility of Modi’s personal and Indian government’s internal and diplomatic space limited?
The huge domestic controversy caused by Modi’s vague statement in his TV speech after the conflict in the Gallowan River may give some answers.
Indian Prime Minister Modi responded to the Sino-Indian border conflict for the first time in a televised speech on June 17th, in which he emphasized twice that Indian soldiers would not “sacrifice in vain”. However, the most controversial thing is that it clearly stated that “China failed to invade any inch of our territory”, and this expression immediately aroused heated discussion at home and abroad. Some Chinese scholars pointed out at the first time that Modi was “euphemistically admitting that the responsibility for the conflict lies with India”, and [12] the opposition Congress Party in India also questioned Modi’s government’s concealment of the truth of the incident.
Then, under pressure, the Indian Prime Minister’s Office issued two papers to clarify Modi’s speech, pointing out that “Prime Minister Modi’s observation pointed out that no Chinese soldiers successfully appeared on the side of India’s actual control line because of the bravery of Indian soldiers”, and further explained that Prime Minister Modi’s expression did not mean that China had no invasion or attempt. [13]
In my opinion, the Indian military is a relatively firm support group of the Modi government. Modi has no reason to offend or deny the Indian army’s actions on the front line, and Modi’s vague statement may be intentional, with two purposes: First, it is to test the domestic reaction and directly respond to the opposition party’s allegations on losing ground; Second, it indirectly conveys a willingness to “cool down”, which can also be confirmed from Modi’s later actions of personally going to the front line to appease the soldiers.
On July 3rd, accompanied by Bipin Rawat, Chief of Staff of National Defense, and Manoj Mukund Narawa, Chief of Staff of the Army, Modi suddenly went to Nim area in Ladakh on the Sino-Indian border and delivered a speech. This practice and the content of his speech also revealed Modi’s willingness to control the mood of the army steadily.
Modi’s entire speech is mainly divided into two levels. The first one is to admire, thank and encourage the frontline officers and men to make efforts to protect the country and defend the country; On the second level, the author believes that Modi tries to convey to the frontline soldiers the idea that India needs to develop by itself in a peaceful environment: “The era of colonial expansion is over, and now is the era of reform and development”, “Now is the opportunity for development, and development is also the foundation of the future”, “We will create a strong and self-reliant India, and we will do it!” [14]
When Prime Minister Modi began to talk about peaceful development to the army on the one hand, and molded and consolidated the guardian’s establishment to the people on the other hand, the tension between tough appeal and pragmatic pursuit became incisively and vividly, and Modi’s personal flexibility in internal affairs and diplomacy was also affected.
Modi’s demand for toughness at home is also reflected in its far-reaching influence on its diplomatic relations with neighboring countries.
A series of policies issued by Modi government towards Indian Muslims, including the abolition of Constitution 370 and the promulgation of the Citizenship Amendment Act, caused protests from Bangladesh and other countries; The territorial disputes between Nepal and India in Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura continue to ferment.
After the Sino-Indian border conflict, almost all other countries in South Asia, which are traditionally regarded as India’s allies or their spheres of influence, remained relatively silent, and did not respond to India’s groundless accusations against China at the first time, while Nepal responded to India’s provocation and took the initiative to launch a new version of the national map. Some media scholars in India also began to reflect on the limitations of Modi’s personalized diplomacy, [15] calling for a return to pragmatic diplomatic practice.
The coexistence of pragmatic and tough people seems to be feasible in theory. However, from the change of Modi’s image, there is a huge tension between blindly tough people based on religious national sentiment and pragmatic pursuit of long-term development. The clear turn of Modi’s ruling logic at least shows that this attempt to give consideration to both is difficult to achieve in Indian election politics. However, the domestic opposition parties began to choose to avoid security issues as much as possible because they were accused of “anti-state” at any time and were under great pressure against national sentiment, which further contributed to the spread of populism.
Based on the existing observations, India’s domestic political trends may show such a trend in the medium and long term. The Indian Party continues to politicize security issues directly or indirectly to serve the election of the State Legislative Council; However, the vast majority of opposition parties will selectively avoid the discussion of issues involving territory and national security, instead attack the specific contents of various policies launched by Modi government, and try their best to bring voters’ attention back to domestic issues (similar to the newly launched new education policy and environmental policy, etc.) and weaken voters’ national sentiment during the election.
Under this situation, the COVID-19 epidemic has not been effectively controlled in India, and its economic performance is still in a downturn. However, the Indian government has unreasonably banned Chinese companies under the slogan of “self-reliance” and built trade barriers, which will certainly hinder India’s long-term development.
(This article was first published in the second issue of “Regional Observation” of Tsinghua University Institute of International and Regional Studies, and was slightly modified when reprinted by Observer Network. )
Source:https://www.guancha.cn/leidingkun/2020_10_07_567348.shtml
Kchew's Blog 